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[The following article is reproduced with permission of the Washington-based Council on
Hemispheric Affairs (COHA). It was published in the Feb. 16, 1994 edition of COHA's biweekly
publication, "Washington Report on the Hemisphere."]
On Feb. 9, from his exile in Washington, President Jean- Bertrand Aristide dramatically broke
his silence on the refugee issue. On that day, he did what he wanted to do, but was restrained
by US special envoy Lawrence Pezzullo from doing at his Jan. 14 Miami conference. Now he felt
emboldened to denounce the administration's refugee policy of summary interdiction and forcible
repatriation as a "Floating Berlin Wall" that demonstrably was in violation of international law.
Washington lashed back instantly and without mercy. The administration found Aristide's remarks
"mystifying" and one White House source was quoted as expressing "indignation" at his implicit
threat to abrogate the gentlemen's agreement he made a year ago with the incoming Clinton
administration to "temporarily" sanction its controversial refugee policy. The White House, keenly
aware of the political damage done to the Carter re-election campaign by the Cuban 1980 Mariel
boatlift, was in no mood to contemplate the phenomenon of tens of thousands of Haitians trying to
reach US shores. Moreover, there would be the extra embarrassment of some not making it alive, as
the bodies of four drowned Haitians, who just washed up on a Florida beach, testified.
Aristide's original purpose at Miami of addressing the plight of the refugees was adulterated, at
US insistence, to include the issue of national reconciliation. That theme also was at the core of a
conference planned for last December by Aristide's then prime minister, Robert Malval. Pezzullo
and a Washington lobbyist retained by the Mev clan Haiti's richest won over Malval to the State
Department's game plan that Aristide must consult with the armed forces and his other political
enemies in order to produce a good fit. But what Pezzullo peddled as "national reconciliation" in
reality provided Aristide's foes with a virtual veto over whatever truncated power he would be
allowed, even if he was permitted to return to the island. To be heard, the armed forces only had to
communicate their agenda to the Mevs, who, in turn, would make it their own. Aristide saw through
this cabal and aborted the gathering at the last minute.
Meanwhile, Pezzullo hasn't explained why the administration seems unable to distinguish between
legal and illegal political forces, and why it still looks upon the armed forces as a legitimate
negotiation partner after they overthrew the constitutional order and wantonly murdered admirable
citizens. The question is, with a transgressor, do you issue invitations of ultimatums? At Miami,
Pezzullo restated his leitmotif that only after the country's various factions are reconciled can
Washington help. Translated into street talk, this means that unless Aristide cuts a deal with the
military, he is one dead duck. This attitude represents not only a shortsighted act of expediency
on Washington's part, but also seems to have very little to do with the Clinton administration's
insistence that "democratization" is at the heart of its foreign policy. Why will yet another fallow
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conversation with the military be likely to advance the prospects of constitutional rule as Pezzullo
should well know from his own humiliating experiences at its hands.
Haiti is a battlefield where the forces of enlightenment and degradation are so distinct that only the
administration's inept foreign policy machine finds it challenging to distinguish between the two. As
a result, it is imperative that those who have served the President so unwisely on Haiti be outflanked
in order that he be allowed to realize that his largely hortative approach to international events
has once again failed and that his already stressed foreign policy scorecard is about to be further
handicapped. When President Clinton turned to his childhood, college and law school chums to fill
some of his senior foreign policy posts, he made some major staffing errors. Clearly, his cronies on
the National Security Council and in the State Department have been hapless at arm twisting the
Haitian military compared to US Trade Representative Mickey Kantor's shiv-wielding gladiatorial
success with Japanese and GATT negotiators.
Washington's latest uproar over Haiti occurred on Feb. 15 when a hand-picked delegation of
its parliamentarians, sponsored by a conservative Washington group in consort with the State
Department, came here on a pre- scripted mission and met with members of Congress and others.
Before one of them broke off from the group to protest its unsanctioned conversion to a deliberative
role, the Haitian lawmakers proposed that Aristide immediately appoint a new prime minister.
Under this plan, which represents a clear retreat from last July's Governors Island Accord, no date
would be set for Aristide's return to Haiti, nor guarantee that the military would go back to the
barracks. The new scheme would almost certainly represent Aristide's Waterloo and probably the
Clinton administration's Dunkirk.
Ultimately, the inter-American community, and certainly the White House, must face up to the fact
that the issue of democratic legitimacy is at stake, and not only in Haiti. It must turn its attention,
if even briefly, from its near- exclusive absorption in such matters as neoliberal reforms and free
trade, to re-read the responsibilities of OAS members. Under the 1991 Santiago declaration, the
hemispheric nations pledged to take concerted action against any extra- constitutional changes.
Inevitably, that must mean that some contingency could arise which will require turning to an inter-
American peacekeeping force, if only to prevent the Santiago documents from becoming one more
windy OAS handout. Those whose legitimacy only derives from their guns must not be allowed to
enshrine the precedent that the will of the people can be thwarted with impunity. This is what is at
stake in Haiti, and the failure of the US to honor its responsibility must be seen for the dereliction
of duty and lapse from rectitude that the offense represents. Haiti's Aristide has conducted himself
with honor; can the same be said of Clinton?
-- End --
